Moral Error Theory - The Quest For a Comprehensive Moral Theory

To being our discussion on a quest for a comprehensive moral theory we will start with the thought of J.L. Mackie. Mackie claims the perspective of moral scepticism. Mackie writes, 

"First, what I have called moral scepticism is a negative doctrine, not a positive one; it says what there isn't, not what there is."
      J.L. Mackie, "The Subjectivity of Values" in Foundations of Ethics, 14.

Mackie does not believe and in this case argues against the idea that there are such things as objective moral values and duties. In short, Mackie questions whether there exists a moral standard which binds all humanity throughout all space and time. He writes, 

"Second, what I have called moral scepticism is an ontological thesis, not a linguistic or conceptual one."
      J.L. Mackie, "The Subjectivity of Values" in Foundations of Ethics, 14.

Instead, Mackie argument proceeds from what he calls relativity and queerness. Mackie asserts first the argument from relativity which 

"has as its premiss the well-known variation in moral codes form one society to another and form one period to another, and also the differences in moral beliefs between different groups and classes within a complex community."
      J.L. Mackie, "The Subjectivity of Values" in Foundations of Ethics, 18.

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 Moral sense, moral intuition, and moral judgment are all relative to the time, circumstance, desire, society, and subsequent response of a given subject. When any of these variables change, even by degree, the resulting response is also different, and sometimes radically different. And though they be different they are still held as truly moral or immoral by the subject. Taken in this way it seems obvious that moral sense, intuition, and judgment are indeed multifarious, relative, and subjective. Second to Mackie's argument from relativity is his argument from queerness. Mackie writes, 

"If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities of relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing."
      J.L. Mackie, "The Subjectivity of Values" in Foundations of Ethics, 19.
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Note here that Mackie offers a conditional bi-partite issue, one metaphysical and the other epistemological. If there are objective moral values, then they must be unique, sui generous, or as he puts it, "queer." Second is that if such objective moral values were to exist, then we as moral agents would need an equally unique moral apparatus to know these objective moral values. Mackie rejects the existence of such things and the knowledge of the same. 

From a Christian perspective, what if we agree with Mackie? What if we agree insofar as to say that that moral phenomena are indeed multifarious at least on the surface and thus at a minimum, appear to be relative. The Scriptures proclaim that there have been times when "every man did that which was right in his own eyes" [Judges 21:25]. In another place the Scriptures teach that "every imagination of man's heart was only evil continually" [Genesis 6:5]. We see in at least these two cases the "relative" good and evil, right and wrong of mankind. Taking the example from Judges, every man's "right" is not the same as his neighbor's and vice versa. Each man regarded his "right" as "right." In the Genesis example, when every imagination of man's heart was evil, it stands to reason that for these people their understanding of that evil imagination was relative to what they regarded as evil, or sort of evil, or not as bad as that guy over there. 

What if we agree that if objective moral values do exists then they must be unique and if we are to know these values, then we must have a unique faculty to know them.  Christians do agree insofar as objective moral values exist in the mind of a unique being we call God. The Psalmist writes in Psalm 119:137, "Righteous art thou O Lord." Jesus says in Luke 18:19, "No one is good, save one, that is God." So then metaphysically speaking, there exists a unique metaphysical source for objective moral value and that source is the person of the Triune God. 

What if we agree further that if objective moral values do exist then there must be a sui generis apparatus for knowledge. The Scriptures teach in Romans 1:18-19, "For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them." Again, note that God's wrath is revealed against all [i.e., multifarious or subjective] ungodliness and unrighteousness of humankind. Furthermore, humankind suppresses the truth in their unrighteousness.

Why? Because the things we know of the Source of Objective Moral Values [i.e., God] are "manifest" in them, in us. And why is that? Because God showed it to them, to us. The word "manifest" means to make clear. The Source of objective morality makes clear what is objectively moral. The apostle Paul goes on to write that "the invisible things of him [God] from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made [humans], even his [God's] eternal power and Godhead; so that they [humanity] are without excuse." So then God, the Source of objective morality, makes clear morality and the creation clearly sees the same. Christianity claims that we do have a source of objective moral beliefs in a person, the Triune God. Furthermore, it is claimed that we do understand because this Source has taken upon Himself to clearly reveal these moral values to us. 

In short, Christianity acknowledges and encompasses the moral phenomena known as moral subjectivity while at the same time positing a solution to the existence and knowledge of objective moral values. Indeed, you may not agree with Christianity, but consider its explanatory force and scope. To this point it is a quite robust moral theory, is it not?

Next time we will continue with Moral Error Theory by looking at Richard Joyce's Myth of Morality. We'll see if Christianity has anything in common or at least in the neighborhood of commonality with his moral theory.